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Responding to Catastrophes: A Public
Health Perspective
Ronald Waldman*
I. INTRODUCTION
From a public health perspective, it is difficult to define exactly what a
catastrophe is. Catastrophes can be of sudden onset or they can develop slowly;
they can be the result of natural causes, such as hurricanes, droughts, or
earthquakes, or they can be man-made, a consequence of war or of terrorist acts.
Some would say that the distinction between these is not totally clear-even in
earthquakes, for example, mortality rates are predictably higher among the poor,
those who live in housing that does not conform to local construction standards.
The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 did not spare anyone on the basis
of socioeconomic status, but those with means were able to rebuild, rehabilitate,
and reconstruct their lives much more rapidly and more completely than those
who had only minimal assets. Finally, the plight of the poor left behind in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, one of the world's most recent major catastrophes,
was visible on televisions around the world. The blurriness of the lines between
these categories, acute versus slow onset and natural versus man-made disaster,
has led some to coin the term "complex emergency." The global response to
complex emergencies has become a subject of relatively recent study and many
of its medical, engineering, and even legal ramifications are still being refined.
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Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition of exactly what
constitutes a complex emergency. One common description, initially
promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the lead public
health agency of the United States government, contends that complex
emergencies are "situations affecting large civilian populations that usually
involve a combination of factors including war or civil strife, food shortages, and
population displacement, resulting in significant excess mortality."1 This
definition is obviously imprecise, but it is clear that events such as the
outpouring of hundreds of thousands of Hutus into neighboring Tanzania and
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the wake of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda generally fit the definition. The displacement of villagers in
the Darfur region of Sudan, fleeing both to more southern parts of that country
and over the border to Chad, is another clear-cut example of a complex
emergency.
Other aspects of these catastrophes are highlighted in a different definition
of a complex emergency: "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society
where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from
internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that
goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing
United Nations country programs.' 2 This definition does not characterize the
situation as much as it does the nature of the response, which needs to be
"humanitarian" and requires a team of government, nongovernmental, and
United Nations agencies to work in the absence of a functional state (such as in
Somalia and Kosovo) or in the face of an unwilling governmental partner (as is
the case in Sudan or Burma).
Because of the imprecision of these and other definitions, the response to
complex emergencies is somewhat unpredictable. Some have gone so far as to
suggest that a reasonable definition of a catastrophe that requires response on
the part of the "humanitarian community"3 is an event that is widely covered by
CNN and/or other news media. Certainly, the political response to complex
emergencies, especially when concerns of national security are not paramount,
can be heavily influenced by the media. The 1991 US military incursion in
1 Michael Toole and Ronald Waldman, The Public Health Aspect of Complex Emelgendes and Refugee
Situations, 18 Ann Rev Public Health 283, 285 (1997).
2 This definition is given by the CDC, available online at <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ierh/
FAQ.htm> (visited Oct 17, 2005).
3 Throughout this Article, the term "humanitarian community" is used to refer to all those who are
involved in providing relief to disaster-affected populations. This can include bilateral and
multilateral donor agencies, both political and technical United Nations agencies, and the many
not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations that generally respond with varying degrees of
effort when humanitarian assistance is required.
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Somalia is widely cited as a case in point. Without clear objectives, until about
twenty years ago, emergency relief was based primarily on good intentions. For
example, generous people and organizations were moved to action by
photographs of starving babies in Europe after the Second World War; in Biafra
during the war of secession in Nigeria in the late 1960s; and in Thailand,
Somalia, and Ethiopia during the late 1970s and 1980s. Humanitarian assistance
to people in those settings was based on an outpouring of generous,
kindhearted, and charitable support from both the public and private sectors.
However, it was not always effective. At least to a degree, it was not effective
because humanitarian assistance was a profession without standards, without
benchmarks against which the performance of the humanitarian community
could be measured. In short, there was a lack of accountability both to those
who provided funds for relief efforts and, perhaps more importantly, to those
who were ostensibly being helped. One of the leading myths of disaster relief
was that any kind of assistance, in any amount, was always helpful.4 This
approach has now been proven, time and again, to be unwarranted, while a more
scientifically oriented approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance in
complex emergencies has evolved. The latter approach and the problems that
have emerged in association with its development are explained further in this
Article.
II. MORTALITY IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
Following an analysis of complex emergencies that included the refugee
crisis engendered by the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the flight of
Ogaden-based Somali ethnic peoples from Ethiopia to Somalia following the
overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, and the largely man-made Ethiopian
famine of the mid-1980s, it became clear that in most complex emergencies,
crude mortality rates (the number of deaths occurring in a defined population
over a specified period of time) could be substantially elevated. From a public
health perspective, it is logical to suggest that a primary objective of
humanitarian relief should be to lower the crude mortality rate to below a
specific level as rapidly as possible. Even recently, it has been stated that
"mortality is the prime indicator by which to assess the impact of a crisis, the
magnitude of needs and the adequacy of the humanitarian response."'
Accordingly, a threshold level of "acceptable" mortality was established on the
basis of prevailing rates in developing countries, as reported by the United
4 Eric K. Noji, ed, The Public Health Consequences of Disasters 17 (Oxford 1997).
5 Francesco Checchi and Les Roberts, Interpreting and Using Mortaho Data in Humanitarian Emergencies
1, available online at <http://www.hapinternational.org/pdfword/541-networkpaper.pdf>
(visited Oct 17, 2005).
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Nations Statistics Office. Because a typical mortality rate in sub-Saharan Africa
and South and Southeast Asia might range between 0.3-0.5 deaths per ten
thousand people per day, a threshold for mortality that might be useful in
distinguishing a public health emergency from a non-emergent situation was
suggested to be one death per ten thousand people per day, representing a
doubling or trebling of the baseline rate. It was proposed that whenever the
crude mortality rate in a population rose above the threshold level, a
humanitarian response should be triggered. Intensive emergency relief efforts
should be aimed at lowering the mortality to below the threshold. Finally, an
emergency could be said to have subsided when mortality dips below the
threshold rate.6 As can be seen in Figure 1,' several quite different scenarios have
been observed.
FIGURE 1. CRUDE MORTALITY RATES IN SELECTED
REFUGEE CAMPS, 1979-1989
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In Thailand in late 1979, for example, a large group of refugees from
Cambodia was rapidly settled in a number of what became known as "death
camps" because of what was, at that time, an extremely high crude mortality rate
for the region of about 3.3 deaths per ten thousand people per day. A massive
intervention ensued, characterized by a veritable invasion of Western medical
6 Due to the high degree of variability of local mortality rates, it has recently been suggested that
the widely-accepted threshold level of 1 death/10,000/day be modified to "a doubling of the
baseline rate." For a general discussion, see Debarati Guha-Sapir and Willem Gijsbert van
Panhuis, Conflict-RelatedMortaiy: An Analysis of 37 Datasets, 28 Disasters 418-28 (Dec 2004).
7 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Famine-Affected, Refugee, and Dirplaced Populations:
Recommendations for Public Health Issues, 41 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep RR-13 (1992),
available online at <http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/prevguid/p00001 13/pO0001 13.asp> (visited
Dec 2, 2005).
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personnel, the rapid construction of hospitals and clinics, and the provision of
food, water, and other essential commodities. The rapid and favorable evolution
of the situation, with mortality falling to the baseline level, well below the
"emergency threshold" within a few months, was felt to be indicative of a highly
successful relief effort.
The 1985 situation in Sudan was somewhat different. Initially measured
crude mortality was, for that time, the highest ever recorded, at seven to eight
deaths per ten thousand people per day. Massive publicity in the West, including
the celebrated "Band-Aid" and "We are the World" efforts of popular
entertainers in the United Kingdom and the United States triggered an
unprecedented response from the entire humanitarian community. However, as
can be seen from the graph above, the crude mortality rate fell far more slowly
than had been the case in Thailand. In fact, one year after the opening of the
camps in which refugees were settled, the crude mortality rate was just reaching
the threshold level.
The last line in this graph depicts the unusual case of the Hartisheik B
refugee camp in Eastern Ethiopia, where refugees from Somalia were
temporarily settled in the late 1980s. In this situation, the crude mortality rate,
which had actually been below the emergency threshold at the time the camp
was opened, rose steadily for nine months after the relief effort by the
international humanitarian community was initiated. Although multiple factors
were responsible, the fundamental explanation for this surprising finding is that
insufficient food was reaching the camp. Obviously, increasing mortality rates in
a population that is dependent upon external assistance for survival should be
indicative of an unacceptable relief effort.
Finally, no discussion of mortality in complex emergencies should omit the
extreme catastrophe that occurred in refugee camps near Goma in the former
Zaire. As alluded to earlier, between five hundred thousand and eight hundred
thousand Hutu citizens of Rwanda fled to four refugee camps in July of 1994 in
order to escape possible retribution for the Hutu role in the genocide of
Rwandan Tutsis that had occurred in the Spring. Shortly after their arrival in the
vicinity of Lake Kivu, a virulent epidemic of cholera swept through the entire
population, resulting in approximately forty-five thousand deaths over a four
week period. In connection with this outbreak, a number of salient points
should be discussed.
First, the number of deaths that occurred was determined with unusual
accuracy. Several of the camps were hastily established on ground composed of
volcanic rock. Because graves could not be dug, most of the dead were brought
to the side of the road where trucks hired by international authorities-in this
case, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
("UNHCR")-loaded the corpses and hauled them to where they could be
Winter 2006
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buried in mass graves. Counting the bodies became part of the job description
of those hired for this grisly task.
Second, despite the fact that an accurate numerator (number of dead) was
determined, mortality rates in this population can only be given in approximate
terms because the size of the population was never clearly determined. Best
estimates placed the population at between five hundred thousand and eight
hundred thousand so that by some estimates the epidemic caused a literal
decimation of the initial population in only one month's time. In fact, estimated
crude mortality rates in the camps ranged from 29.4 to 41.3 deaths per 10,000
people per day, by far the highest ever recorded in a complex emergency to that
time.
Third, most deaths occurred out of the reach of the international
community. One can only imagine that an attitude of fear and trepidation
pervaded a population that had survived the unimaginable trauma of the
genocidal period. These refugees must have been especially wary of the largely
white and Western relief community that had gathered to build clinics and
hospitals in an attempt to establish food and water supplies and to distribute
materials for shelter. In any case, fewer than 10 percent of those who died were
apparently seen for medical care by the humanitarian community. In fact,
although 45,435 bodies were collected by UN trucks, only 4,335 deaths were
reported by health relief agencies. According to some informed estimates, not a
single cholera death was prevented by the humanitarian community during the
entire relief effort.8
The situation was even worse for children. As death spread through the
population, many children were orphaned and many more abandoned by the
surviving parents or relatives to the care of the humanitarian community. For
security reasons, expatriate relief workers did not stay in the camps at night.
Upon their return each morning, however, groups of unaccompanied children
would be waiting outside their clinics. These children, many of them babies and
many of them sick, were taken to makeshift orphanages in the town of Goma
where they were left, frequently unsupervised, to fend for themselves. Mortality
rates in these children, admittedly based on small numbers, reached as high as
several hundred per ten thousand children per day.9
A few additional words are in order concerning mortality in complex
emergencies in order to set the stage for further discussion. These concern not
the levels of mortality, but its causes. If a significant number of deaths in these
Goma Epidemiology Group, Public Health Impact of Rvandan Refugee Crisis: What Happened in Goma,
Zaire, in Juy, 1994?, 345 Lancet 339, 342 (1995).
9 Scott F. Dowell, et al, Health and Nutrition in Centers for Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Experience
from the 1994 Rwandan Refugee Crisis, 273 JAMA 1802, 1803 (1995).
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settings were due to intractable diseases or to diseases for which the only cures
were expensive and relatively ineffective, then the poor performance of the
humanitarian community, as shown in several of the examples presented above,
might be excusable, at least to a degree. In fact, however, this was not the case.
Because armed conflict is frequently a part of the definition of a complex
emergency, one might expect violence to be a frequent cause of death. Most
often, though, the vast majority of deaths result from indirect causes, principally
infectious diseases whose occurrence is favored by the crowding of large
populations into temporary, substandard settlements with compromised water
supplies and food of insufficient quantity and quality.
As a result, deaths in most complex emergencies are due to common
conditions like diarrhea (including cholera and bacillary dysentery), pneumonia,
malaria in areas where it is endemic, and vaccine-preventable diseases like
measles and meningitis.' ° These can be frequently compounded by malnutrition,
a condition that does not affect the occurrence of infectious diseases but can
increase the likelihood that an illness will result in death. For example, although
many in Europe and the United States associate the Sudan refugee crisis of the
mid-1980s with drought, crop failure, and starvation on the basis of the pathetic
images of starving children that were ubiquitous on our television sets, more
than one-half of all deaths were due to measles. Measles rarely causes death-
and rarely even occurs-rn industrialized countries because a safe, effective, and
highly affordable vaccine has been routinely administered to children since 1964.
In developing countries, however, measles vaccine coverage is comparatively
low. Although policies recommending mass campaigns with the measles vaccine
were adopted following the Sudan episode, they are not always implemented.
Thus, during a 2000 famine in southern Ethiopia, investigators found that 22
percent of the deaths in children less than 5 years-old that they sampled were
attributable to measles."
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORTALITY IN
COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
What can be learned from this discussion of mortality in complex
emergencies that might be of interest to students and practitioners of
international law? To start with a relatively trivial point, it should be noted that
in the course of the international response to complex emergencies, many health
care professionals from countries around the world descend upon the territory
10 M~ire A. Connolly, et al, Communicable Diseases in Complex Emergencies: Impact and Challenges, 364
Lancet 1974, 1975-77 (2004).
11 Peter Salama, et al, Malnutriion, Measles, Mortally, and the Humanitarian Response During a Famine in
Ethiopia, 286 JAMA 563, 563 (2001).
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of a sovereign state to deliver health services to a population in need. Few, if
any, of these practitioners are licensed to practice in the country that is hosting
them. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, more than ninety-five countries around
the world offered almost $1 billion in assistance to the United States. Among
them, many developing countries with significant experience in dealing with
disasters offered financial and material aid, including Bangladesh, whose offer of
$1 million was accepted. 12 But one can only imagine what the response of the US
government, or of the American Medical Association, might have been should
Bangladesh have offered the services of a team of diarrheal disease control
specialists with the same expertise as the team that was sent to help quell the
cholera epidemic in Goma. 3 Questions of licensing, competence, and liability
would surely have been raised. In international disaster settings, however, there
is rarely an authority that assumes the responsibility of verifying credentials and
approving health service providers.
More important than credentials, however, is the question of ability-are
those who respond qualified, on the basis of knowledge and experience, to
provide an adequate level of care to the affected population? Approaches to the
prevention and control of the leading causes of disease and death in complex
emergencies have been studied and described. The provision of health care for
those suffering from the leading causes of morbidity and mortality in complex
emergencies is not overly complicated from a technical standpoint, but it does
require some familiarity with current policies and recommendations, as well as
with the appropriate medicines and their potential adverse and secondary effects.
Nevertheless, many of the nongovernmental organizations that send relief teams
to work in the health sector in emergencies do not have training programs, nor
do they necessarily require that their personnel demonstrate knowledge and
technical competence prior to being assigned to the field. This lack of familiarity
with required skills can result in unnecessary loss of life. As the Bangladeshi
physicians cited above state in their article about the cholera epidemic in Goma,
"the slow rate of rehydration, inadequate use of oral rehydration therapy, use of
inappropriate intravenous fluids, and inadequate experience of health workers in
the management of severe cholera are thought to be some of the factors
associated with the failure to prevent so many deaths during the epidemic."
1 4
12 US Embassy in Bangladesh, press release regarding international assistance for Hurricane Katrina
victims (Sept 8, 2005), transcript available online at <http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/prelsep08-
05.html> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
13 A.K. Siddique, et al, Why Treatment Centres Failed to Prevent Cholera Deaths among Rwandan Refugees in
Goma, Zaire, 345 Lancet 359 (1995).
14 Id at 359.
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Interestingly, to a large degree as a result of the failed humanitarian relief
effort in Goma, a substantial number of training programs, both short courses
and graduate degree offerings in the practice of public health in complex
emergencies have been developed. It should be possible for nongovernmental
organizations, either voluntarily or as a condition of receiving government
funding, to ensure that at least an acceptable proportion of health teams have
demonstrable knowledge of the skills most likely to be of benefit to disaster-
affected populations. To date, however, no such requirements have been
adopted.
The affected populations have little recourse in cases of incompetent
medical care. They are distressed, vulnerable, and expected to be docile and
compliant. Their source of care is determined by various means, but usually by a
United Nations coordinating agency, which could be UNHCR in the case of a
refugee crisis or, when designated as the lead UN agency by the Secretary-
General, the World Health Organization or the United Nations Children's Fund
("UNICEF"). It is becoming increasingly common for the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ("OCHA") to function as the overall
coordinating agency for disaster relief and to appoint one of the other UN
agencies as the lead agency for the health sector. This agency, in turn, is
responsible not only for the formulation and promulgation of appropriate health
sector policies and the prioritization of programs, but also for assigning specific
relief agencies to camps, settlements, or sites in a way that ensures that all of the
disaster-affected population has access to appropriate health services. When this
effort is not coordinated properly, high-priority health services will not be
available to all and it is conceivable that preventable deaths will occur. One
commentator has gone so far as to suggest that poor coordination be listed
among the diseases mentioned above as a leading contributor to excess
preventable mortality in complex emergencies."
Another nagging issue with legal ramifications related to the management
of common diseases concerns whether or not the humanitarian community must
conform to national policies governing health care in the countries where it is
providing relief. The problem presented here is that the national policy
formulation process can be slow and cumbersome, and inadequate or
inappropriate policies can remain in place for many years, especially in countries
where the implementation of more technically correct health care policies may
exceed the financial means of government, but not of the humanitarian
community. A case in point concerns a confrontation between Mddecins Sans
Fronti&res ("MSF"), one of the leading humanitarian agencies working in the
health sector, and the Ministry of Health of Burundi, a country in which civil
15 Serge Mal6, Refugees: Do Not Forget the Basics, 49 World Health Statistics Q 221, 222-23 (1996).
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strife had been responsible for the displacement of tens of thousands of
individuals and for the compromised security of hundreds of thousands of
others. Malaria is a leading cause of death among children in Burundi and,
during an epidemic that occurred there from 2000-2001, over three million
cases occurred among the country's population of 6.5 million. One reason for
the high burden of illness may have been that the malaria-causing parasite had
developed resistance to the drug of choice designated by national policy. MSF,
working in a circumscribed area of the country, found it unethical to offer
treatment it knew to be ineffective for "its" patients. While advocating for the
adoption and use of a new, albeit more expensive, but more effective, anti-
malarial drug combination (artemisinin plus amodiaquine), MSF began to
dispense it. This action was deemed illegal by government authorities and MSF's
malaria-related work in Burundi was suspended. Subsequently, the government,
under continued pressure from MSF and other organizations, agreed to adopt a
new policy by July 2003. While MSF has been providing the new treatment in
the provinces where it is working, the government of Burundi remains unable to
implement the treatment on a wider scale for a variety of reasons, including the
relatively high cost of artemisinin and its limited supply on the world market. 6
As a result, only patients in MSF's service areas had access to reliably
effective anti-malarial treatment. This dual health care system is difficult for a
fledgling government attempting to establish legitimacy to tolerate. On the other
hand, of course, it could easily be argued that were it not for MSF's ability to
provide effective treatment, at least after the policy change was effectuated, and
even before, no Burundian would have benefited from the technological
advances that the humanitarian agency was able to provide. The humanitarian
tradition has long been more concerned with basic human needs, including
health care, than it has been with accepting legal constraints to effective
humanitarian action. 7 Conflicts between the humanitarian community and the
laws of sovereign states occur frequently. In some instances there are
undoubtedly good reasons for government policy to be strictly enforced. In
others, logic and devotion to a cause may dictate that state concerns be
considered secondary -to the humanitarian imperative. More study, critical
analysis, and consideration of some of these thorny issues would help guide
appropriate action.
16 Mdecins Sans Fronti~res-USA, International Activity Report 2002: Burundi, available online at
<http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2002/Burundi.cfm> (visited Oct 7,
2005).
17 James Darcy, Human Rigbts and International Legal Standards: What Do Relief Workers Need to Know?,
19 Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 8 (Feb 1997), available online at <http://www.odi.
org.uk/rights/Pubications/networkpaperNol 9.pdf> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
Vol. 6 No. 2
Responding to Catastrophes: A Public Health Perspective
IV. INDIVIDUAL AND PUBLIC RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE IN
CONFLICT-RELATED DISASTERS
To this point, the discussion has concerned large populations. But what
about the interests of the individual caught up in conflict-related disasters? Yet
another crucially important tension exists between two fundamental objectives
of humanitarian relief: the protection of the right of an individual to the highest
attainable state of health possible and the preservation of the health of the
public. There need not be conflict between these principles as long as there is a
clear understanding that, in the end, the fundamental objective of public health
interventions in complex emergencies is utilitarian: to do the most good for the
most people. Implementing interventions that are primarily aimed at achieving
this objective may, at times, mean that individuals must be denied care that they
might receive in other, more stable circumstances.
When mass casualties occur and the number of patients overwhelms the
human and material resources available, emergency room physicians use one of a
number of systems of triage to decide who will receive care in what order. A
patient whose life could possibly be saved, but only by taking time and care away
from a number of others who require equally life-saving but less time-
consuming care, can be left to die. Imagine a situation where a four year old
child has suffered a severe head wound and requires major surgery in order to
live. The parents are frantic for their only child to be treated, but the health staff
is attending to other seriously wounded patients. After a few hours of neglect
the child dies, but others have been saved. At the end of the day, what has been
achieved is not a good outcome by any means, but it is the best possible
outcome.
In an all too real sense, complex emergencies are the emergency rooms of
public health. Appropriately, an equivalent system of triage is used to decide
what programs should be prioritized. 18 Although the needs of a disaster-affected
population are specific to each setting and should be rapidly evaluated prior to
initiating action, enough evidence has been accumulated from the study of
complex emergencies over the last few decades to develop a suggested list of
priority interventions. 9  The need for information, though, cannot be
overlooked, and an assessment of the local situation followed by the earliest
possible establishment of a health surveillance system is essential. Immediate
attention should be given to ensuring that the population has access to those
things that are necessary to sustain life-adequate quantities of appropriate food,
18 Ronald J. Waldman, Prioritnsg Health Care in Complex Emergenies, 357 Lancet 1427, 1427 (2001).
19 See, for example, Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Refugee Health: An Approach to Emergeny Situations 35
(Macmillan 1997).
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sufficient water of acceptable quality (although quantity is much more important
than quality), acceptable sanitation facilities, and shelter. Health care is secondary
to these concerns, although those working in the health sector should certainly
be establishing their programs while specialists in the other areas are
implementing theirs. Based on past experience, the first health intervention is
usually a measles vaccination campaign aimed at children between the ages of six
months through twelve or fifteen years of age. Only after this has been
completed should other interventions be instituted.
The control of communicable diseases is, in most settings, high on the list
of health sector priorities, as these are clear dangers to the public. When
epidemics occur, as is often the case for reasons cited above, they must be dealt
with to the abandonment of other activities. Conditions that can be addressed in
the short-term will be given greater attention than those that require longer-term
care. For example, time and human resources are rarely, if ever, accorded to
disaster-affected patients with HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis until control measures
for diarrhea, malaria, and other diseases of epidemic potential have been fully
instituted. As a general rule, programs aimed at these and other chronic diseases
will not be established until the emergency has subsided, until it is clear that
population movement will be minimal for at least six months, and until an
agency working in the health sector has assumed a coordinating role.
In other words, in disaster response, appropriate health care is not made
available to everyone, nor should it be. It may not seem fair to suggest that
patients with some diseases should be given treatment while those with others
should not, but it is necessary if the most lives are to be saved. The ethical
implications of triage have been discussed and debated, but in emergency
settings it is a well-accepted and generally recommended process.2" Although the
notion of triage has not been as carefully developed for prioritizing public health
programs as it has for clinical decision-making, the analogy is clear and the
principles remain the same.
V. EMERGENCY RELIEF AND QUALITY OF LIFE
To this point, I have concentrated almost exclusively on mortality
reduction as the end point of humanitarian assistance. It is important, however,
to look not only at the quantity of lives saved, but also at how emergency relief
impacts the quality of those lives. The Goma relief effort was an important
milestone in this regard as well. As the cholera epidemic and other epidemics of
communicable diseases subsided after August 2004, the humanitarian
20 World Medical Association, Polig- Statement on Medical Ethics in the Event of Disasters (Sept 1994),
available online at <http://www.wma.net/e/policy/d7.htm> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
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community began to take stock of what it had done and of what it should
continue to do. It became increasingly clear that as the emergency relief effort
had been imperfectly implemented, so too was the post-emergency assistance
program peculiarly flawed. Hum militia exercised substantial control, by force
and intimidation, over the majority of the population in the camps. By
November 1994, a group of nongovernmental organizations threatened to stop
providing assistance to the camps, claiming that under the prevailing conditions
it was impossible to protect and assist the refugees, that the lives of aid workers
were being threatened, and that, at least figuratively, the refugees were being
held hostage. Aid was being hijacked by the same strongmen who had
engineered the genocide, and the relief efforts could not continue without
violating the principles of humanitarian assistance. The end result was, they
asserted, that their "humanitarian" actions were not helping those in need, but
were, in fact, fueling the conflict.21 By the end of the year, the French section of
MSF and the American NGO International Rescue Committee had both
terminated their operations in Goma. n
With time, it became clear that the Goma situation was not unique. Relief
workers eventually realized that what came to be called "humanitarian space"
had been shrinking as more and more complex emergencies came to be
characterized by conflict-particularly as the populations being served came to
include armed thugs and instigators out to enrich themselves. Incidents occurred
in Liberia and Sudan where the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian relief
were attacked and robbed after receiving relief rations. In other words, the
humanitarian community found itself inadvertently helping people, either
government authorities or community leaders, or both, who were more a part of
the problem than a part of the solution. The political naivet6 of the humanitarian
community that had been understood by a relative few during the Ethiopian
famine of the 1980s became the subject of broad public scrutiny and of severe
criticism after Goma.
Stung by the public impression that it had been "had," and reeling from a
harshly critical multi-donor evaluation report, the humanitarian community
undertook a period of introspection. 3 After Goma, the nature of humanitarian
discourse changed considerably and there was talk of a "new
21 Ian Martin, Hard Choices after Genocide: Human Rights and Political Failures in Rwanda, in Jonathan
Moore, ed, Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention 171 (Rowan & Littlefield
1998).
22 For a complete account of MSF's argument for terminating its operations in Goma, see Fiona
Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action 2 (Cornell 2002).
23 Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, International
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen 1996).
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humanitarianism."24 This new approach to humanitarian assistance was often
referred to as "smart relief." It was characterized by attempts to be more
politically astute and to focus more on the social, economic, and political
consequences of emergency relief efforts, and not just on what was felt to be the
strictly technical interventions aimed at saving lives.2" As one commentator
elegantly put it, the humanitarian community began to question its values and to
reflect on the "apparent clash between humanitarianism and human rights...
[between being] forced to choose between responding to the right to life or the
right to justice and the broader values of civil and political rights.... Striking a
balance between the two is at once the art and the agony of true
humanitarianism.
26
As a result of seeking to achieve this balance, humanitarian relief changed
from a more or less chaotic and undirected set of interventions guided by
charitable motivations to an emerging discipline that drew increasingly heavily
on interpretations of human rights law combined with a more scientific
approach to the provision of assistance to disaster-affected, and usually conflict-
affected, populations. Because some of the failings of the relief effort in Goma
were attributed to a proliferation of inexperienced nongovernmental
organizations that responded to the compelling tragedy of overt genocide and
were assisted by relatively easily accessed funding from both public and private
sources, mainstream humanitarian organizations began to promote the
development of professional standards for relief agencies and their personnel.
One of the first of these sets of standards to appear was the "Code of Conduct
for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in
Disaster Relief."27 Written in the hope that a wide variety of nongovernmental
organizations would sign on to its principles, it is worth presenting here:
This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour.... It is a
voluntary code, enforced by the will of organisation accepting it to maintain
the standards laid down in the Code.28
24 Fiona Fox, New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Bannerfor the 21st Century?, 25 Disasters 275
(2001).
25 For a description of what constitutes "smart relief," see Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm-How
Aid Can Support Peace (Lynne Rienner 1999).
26 Hugo Slim, International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil War in the 1990s: A Glance at Evolving
Practice and Theog, J of Humanitarian Assistance (Dec 19, 1997), available online at <http://
www.jha.ac/articles/a033.htm> (visited Oct 8, 2005).
27 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in
Disaster Relief (hereinafter Code of Conduct), available online at <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/
conduct/index.asp> (visited Oct 17, 2005).
28 Code of Conduct, Purpose, available online at <http://www.ifrc.org/pubhlicat/conduct/
purpose.asp> (visited Nov 22, 2005).
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1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. (The right to receive
humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian
principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries ... we
recognize our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it
is needed.)
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients
and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated
on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious
standpoint.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign
policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the
management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well
as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and
those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall
recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects. 29
Subsequent to its dissemination, more than one hundred fifty NGOs
signed a pledge to respect the Code. Some donor agencies went so far as to
make signing the Code a condition for NGOs to receive funding.
A full discussion of the Code of Conduct is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a few comments are relevant. The Code is as clear a statement of the
right to receive aid as is possible. People in need are not simply the beneficiaries
of charity, dependent on the good will of those better off, but also have the right
to assistance; the provision of humanitarian relief is not a choice; it is a duty.
Furthermore, the Code insists that those who can provide aid should do so on
the basis of need and not on the basis of national or regional security interests or
other reasons of self-interest. Nevertheless, despite this clear expression of what
humanitarian assistance should be, many relief efforts are financed by national
governments, not NGOs, and the motives of the donors do not necessarily
conform to the principles enunciated in the Code.3"
In fact, by virtue of accepting funds from donors that have commercial or
security interests in the country or region in which an emergency is evolving,
29 Code of Conduct, available online at <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp> (visited
Nov 22, 2005).
30 Peter Salama, Bruce Laurence, and Monica L. Nolan, Health and Human Rights in Contemporary
Humanitarian Crises: Is Kosovo More Important than Sierra Leone?, 319 Brit Med J 1569 (1999).
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NGOs can be said to "act as instruments of government foreign policy" no
matter how much they protest this appellation. Indeed, in clearly politicized
relief settings such as Afghanistan or Iraq, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
separate the supposedly impartial humanitarians from the overtly political
government authorities who frequently couch their interventions as primarily
"humanitarian." Indeed, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in remarks to the
National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental
Organizations in October 2001, said, much to the embarrassment of those
leaders: "I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all
of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we
have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us,
such an important part of our combat team." 31 This statement is clearly in
contradiction to what NGOs signed in the Code of Conduct.
Building on the ICRC Code of Conduct, more than one hundred NGOs
participated, in 1997, in the preparation of what is arguably the most important
and most detailed enunciation of the contemporary approach to humanitarian
assistance-the Sphere Project. The Sphere Project consists of two parts: a
"Humanitarian Charter" and "Minimum Standards in Disaster Response." In a
bold attempt to achieve a balance between the spirit of humanitarianism and a
respect for human rights, the Sphere Project is based on two core beliefs: "first,
that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of
calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to
life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance.,
32
The Humanitarian Charter, the first part of the Handbook, defines the
responsibilities of states and parties to guarantee the right to assistance and
protection. It is an attempt to summarize the legal principles on which the
Sphere Project is based. The Charter draws from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions (international humanitarian law), the
Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951, and other international
documents to establish the framework to which it hopes to hold the
humanitarian community accountable. In doing so, it encapsulates the rights-
based approach in three legal principles: the right to life with dignity, the
31 Cohn Powell, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of
Nongovernmental Organizations (Oct 26, 2001), available online at <http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/sept_ 1/poweU_brief31.htm> (visited Nov 22, 2005).
32 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response 5 (Oxfam
2004), available online at <http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/hdbkpdf/hdbk what.pdf>
(visited Dec 15, 2005).
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distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and the principle of non-
refoulement.
33
But, in contrast to the Code of Conduct, which explicitly states that it is
not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or
set up a refugee camp, the Sphere Project sets out to apply a quantitative
construct to the rights it promotes. In order to do so, it sets out a number of
standards that, taken together, represent the minimum levels to be attained in
order for a relief effort to be deemed successful. Finally, it establishes
quantifiable indicators of when those standards can be said to have been
reached. In other words, it says that people in need of humanitarian assistance
have not only a right to life but also a right to life with dignity, and a life with
dignity means that, at a minimum, "all people have safe and equitable access to a
sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic
hygiene.' 3 4 It then defines a "sufficient quantity of water" as "at least 15 liters
per person per day."3 Standards and indicators are presented in this fashion for
water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion; food security, nutrition, and food aid;
shelter, settlement, and non-food items; and health services. For the most part,
the standards and indicators adopted by the Sphere Project were not developed
de novo-they are drawn from previously published recommendations or from
reviews of the best practices of experts in each of the fields addressed. The great
accomplishment of the Sphere Project has been to draw these technical
standards together in an accessible format in such a way that they represent, at
least to a limited degree, the "science" of humanitarian assistance while asserting
that the science exists to support a human rights-based approach to disaster
relief.
The Sphere Project has its shortcomings. It recognizes that the ability to
achieve the minimum standards is frequently beyond the control of the
humanitarian community. The political context in which an emergency unfolds
may restrict the ability of nongovernmental organizations to act; the
"humanitarian space" may be limited. Concerns for personal security due to a
violent environment may similarly restrict access of the agencies to the affected
33 The principle of non-refoulement, as defined in The Sphere Project's Humanitarian Charter, states
that "no refugee shall be sent (back) to a country in which his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion; or where there are substantial grounds for believing that s/he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture." Id at 17, available online at <http://www.sphereproject
.org/handbook/hdbkpdf/hdbkhc.pdf> (visited Dec 15, 2005). Various human rights legal
instruments are cited as the sources for the three principles.
34 See, for example, id at 63.
35 Id.
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population.36 Finally, limited financial resources can be a major obstacle to
reaching the standards. In the face of any of these or other limiting factors, as
discussed above, certain needs of the disaster-affected population need to be
prioritized and certain aspects of the relief effort emphasized more than others.
The Sphere Project suggests that those offering humanitarian assistance "should
strive to meet [the standards] as well as they can. 37
Furthermore, by its own admission, the Sphere Project does not address all
aspects of humanitarian assistance. No standards pertaining to the physical
protection of vulnerable populations, for example, are addressed. Also, no
technical guidelines are presented for the education sector. The Sphere Project
does not purport to be "all things to all people" and it encourages others to fill
in its gaps. Instead, the Sphere Project is an initial effort to define humanitarian
assistance as a right of disaster-affected populations and as the duty of those able
to provide it. There are more profound objections to the Sphere Project as well.
These revolve mostly around what is perceived to be the inflexibility of the
standards and indicators that the Sphere Project promotes-particularly that its
quantitative requirements stifle the creativity of NGOs and overly constrict the
humanitarian response. Some have pointed out that, as was seen in the example
of malaria in Burundi, attaining the minimum standards would leave a disaster-
affected population in a much better condition than the non-affected
surrounding areas, potentially fostering strife between groups.38
Despite the objections, most of which are at least partially valid, the Sphere
Project has been quite successful.39 It has certainly raised the level of discourse
concerning humanitarian assistance among donors and implementing agencies
alike. It has become a centerpiece for training those entering the humanitarian
arena for the first time, and it has profoundly influenced the way that relief
agencies design and monitor their programs. The "rights-based approach" that it
presents has become the norm against which the humanitarian community
measures its work. The standards that the Sphere Project has laid down,
imprecise and incomplete though they might be, have become the most
36 Mani Sheik, et al, Deaths among Humanitarian Workers, 321 Brit Med J 166 (2000).
37 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response at 14 (cited in
note 32).
38 For a summary of objections to the Sphere Project, see Franqois Griinewald and Vronique de
Geoffroy, The Dangers and Inconsistencies of Normative Approaches to Humanitarian Aid-Summary of
Reflections Raised (Dec 1999), available online at <http://www.projetqualite.org/qualproj
/dangers.htm> (visited Oct 12, 2005).
39 Marci Van Dyke and Ronald Waldman, The Sphere Project Evaluation Report (Jan 2004), available
online at <http://www.sphereproject.org/about/ext-eva/sphere eval-fin.pdf> (visited Oct 12,
2005).
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commonly used yardsticks for determining whether or not a relief effort can be
deemed successful.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article discusses aspects of the evolution of the nature of the
humanitarian response to complex emergencies. Beginning with an attempt to
define an emergency in epidemiological terms as situations accompanied by
elevated rates of morbidity and mortality, it documents the shift from a
philanthropic to a rights-based approach to relief. It is important to realize,
though, that no matter how organized, how intelligent, or how effective a
humanitarian relief effort may be, the humanitarian community always arrives
too late. The most important task of humanitarians should not be to minimize
death and suffering, but to prevent them. Given the crises that exist in
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chechnya, Somalia,
Louisiana, and South Asia as this Article is being written, it is clear that the
prevention of the unnecessary loss of life with dignity for millions of people,
whether it be due to natural or man-made disasters of slow or sudden onset, has
not yet been achieved.
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